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Abstract 
Deforestation and degradation are tied to a complex array of socioeconomic and political 
factors. As noted in studies focusing on large-scale policy interventions such as REDD+ and 
payment for ecosystem services programs, among the most important of these factors is land 
tenure and land tenure security. This paper reviews past literature connecting forest outcomes 
and land tenure to better understand broad relationships between land tenure form, land tenure 
security and forest outcomes. From a theoretical perspective, clear and secure forest tenure 
can have either a positive or negative impact on forested land, depending on political and 
economic conditions. We review over 100 empirical cases of forest outcomes under specific 
land tenure conditions and find that land tenure security is associated with less deforestation, 
regardless of the form of tenure. State-owned protected forests are associated with more 
positive forest outcomes relative to private, communal and public land. We discuss 
consistency and identification issues in the current literature around deforestation and land 
tenure, and provide suggestions for future studies and implementation issues for 
policymakers. 
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1 Introduction 
Land tenure and forest property rights are critical issues for the new wave of incentive-based 
policy instruments that aim to safeguard public goods in tropical forests (such as carbon, 
water, and biodiversity) by paying people to protect them. The most recent and highest profile 
of these instruments, REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation1) is 
attracting significant international investment. Property rights tied to tracts of land directly 
determine who is eligible to receive protection incentives as well as who is responsible for 
meeting programs’ contractual obligations. Clear and secure land tenure is critical for an 
efficient REDD+ program and equitable distribution of benefits (Bruce et al. 2010). Yet the 
world’s most carbon-rich and biodiverse forests are often found in regions where ownership is 
ill-defined, contested or insecure ( 
Figure 1  Tenure security and carbon biomass density 
  
Source: Bruce et al. 2010 
). Some describe current ‘chaos’ in property regimes (e.g. Fitzpatrick 2006), particularly in 
areas amid transitions from customary norms where legal codified rules are not yet operative.  
Figure 1  Tenure security and carbon biomass density 
                                                
1 REDD+ is the strategy approved as part of the Cancun Agreements at the recent United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) 16th Conference of Parties (COP 16) to avoid deforestation and/or enhance existing forest carbon 
stocks. 
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Source: Bruce et al. 2010 
 
For these reasons, policy makers see tenure as one of the key issues shaping the social and 
environmental impact of REDD+ and related programs (Sikor et al. 2010, Sunderlin et al. 
2009, Unruh 2008). But the basic tenure and deforestation terminology used in studies is 
often confused or insufficiently defined. Further, it remains unclear whether specific 
forms of tenure are more “sound” than others, when tenure security matters and how 
communities at the forest-farm interface internalize these concepts. 
Yet forest outcomes are connected to a complex array of socioeconomic and political factors. 
Interventions to “clarify tenure” are rarely a simple administrative or technical challenge, but 
warrant a cautious approach, especially since some titling programs have shown varied 
outcomes in improving landholders’ livelihoods (Deininger and Feder 2009). Land is more 
than an input to agricultural or forest productivity. Land has social, cultural and political 
value, and is particularly central to indigenous rights movements (Platteau 2000).  
That said, tenure directly determines who has the right to benefit from forests and who has 
duties to protect them. Addressing tenure issues are pivotal for the success of payments for 
ecosystem services (PES) or REDD+ programs since landholders must have the power to 
make land use decisions and defend land against outside claimants or other agents of land use 
change. Thus there seems little alternative to state-recognized land tenure rights.  
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In practice, the outcomes of forest tenure studies seem to show little consistency in how any 
particular type of land tenure affects forests. There is increasing evidence that indigenous 
groups and those acting collectively can be successful at managing forest resources, but this 
also requires security in their land claims (Nepstad et al. 2006, Sandbrook et al. 2010, 
Wynberg and Laird 2007). Parks generally help avoid tropical deforestation over other land 
tenure forms (Andam et al. 2008, Joppa and Pfaff 2011), but insecure “paper” parks are 
common in areas with limited capacity for governance and, moreover, extensive tracts of 
carbon-heavy, biodiverse forest lies outside of areas under strict protection (Agrawal A 2007, 
Soares-Filho et al. 2006, Sunderlin et al. 2008). We need a better understanding of how the 
form of tenure and tenure security interact to affect forest outcomes. 
Our aim is to better understand the relationship between land tenure form, land tenure security 
and forest outcomes. In doing so, we hope to aid in identification of sites and situations where 
land tenure interventions can help slow deforestation. By land tenure we broadly mean the set 
of institutions and policies that determine how land and its resulting resources are accessed, 
who can benefit from these resources, for how long and under what conditions (USAID 
2008). To gain analytical traction for our study we construct two null hypotheses: 1) there is 
no association between the form of land tenure and the likelihood of forest conservation, and 
2) there is no association between the security of land tenure and the likelihood of 
deforestation. We evaluate these hypotheses in relation to existing theoretical and empirical 
literature.  
We first briefly review tenure terminology and distinguish the form of tenure (i.e. norms and 
rules governing access to land and forests) from tenure security (the assurance that these 
norms and rules will be enforced). Section 3 reviews the theoretical economic literature on 
tenure security and deforestation, and describes the practical limits of these models for 
providing guidance in program implementation. Turning to the empirical literature, in Section 
4 we look for an empirical relationship between the form and security of tenure and forest 
outcomes. In light of the notable variation in tenure forms and level of tenure security 
between regions (Sunderlin et al. 2008), we examine variation in the tenure-forest relationship 
between geographic regions. We conclude by discussing the most likely contexts in which 
tenure might influence emissions via land conversion at the forest-farm interface in the 
tropics. 
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2 Basic terms 
The debate regarding the impact of tenure on forest conservation is hindered by uncertain 
terminology. Property rights and land tenure are often used interchangeably. Here we make 
the distinction that property rights refer to a bundle of rights guiding the use, management, 
and transfer of assets. Land tenure is the set of institutions and policies that determine locally 
how the land and its resources are accessed, who can hold and use these resources, for how 
long and under what conditions (Bruce et al. 2010, USAID 2008). Land tenure, then, is a set 
of property rights associated with the land, and the institutions that uphold those rights.  
The form of land tenure refers to the rules and norms associated with any number of entities, 
such as an individual, a public institution (e.g. the national park service), a private company, a 
group of individuals acting as a collective, a communal or common-property arrangement or 
an indigenous group. Public and communal tenure are prominent in the tropical forest 
management literature given that they often constitute large land areas (e.g. ≥10,000’s ha). 
Such scale is important for REDD+ initiatives to lower transaction costs of implementation 
and maintain ecosystem functions. Public and communal landholdings are generally 
nontransferable, which also has significance for REDD+ as carbon contracts are designed to 
be long-term. 
While land tenure can take on a number of forms, we define security in land tenure as the 
assurance that land-based property rights will be upheld by society. Security does not refer to 
the duration, marketability or the breadth of rights over a piece of land; these are all 
components of a particular form of tenure (Sjaastad and Bromley 2000, van den Brink et al. 
2006). Further, the ability of a government to expropriate land does not necessarily imply 
insecure tenure, as long as just compensation is assured. In this sense, “security” can be over 
the physical asset itself (the parcel of land) or the right to the value of that asset (monetary 
compensation).  
There is increasing recognition among development scholars that formal or legal tenure is not 
always sufficient to impact landholders’ decision-making, but how one perceives tenure is 
what matters (Broegaard 2005); a reaction, in part, to the long-held assumption that land 
titling equaled tenure security (e.g. Deininger and Feder 2009, Feder and Feeny 1991). 
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Therefore, the influence of tenure security – both de facto and de jure – has become the focus 
of many recent discussions. 
3 Theoretical Literature on Land Tenure and Forests 
Development economists have used economic theory to explore the effect of land tenure 
security on forests through at least four different frameworks: game-theory, the Faustmann 
optimal timber rotation model, a model of optimal investment and land use cost-benefit 
analysis. Game-theory models (e.g. Clarke et al. 1993, Hotte 2005) analyze optimal 
enforcement of costly property rights. In these models tenure insecurity unambiguously 
increases the costliness of protection, resulting in a lower optimal resource stock (i.e., more 
deforestation).  
The other three types of models incorporate tenure insecurity as the probability that land will 
be expropriated (without just compensation) at some point in the future. In a Faustmann 
framework (Reed 1984, Zhang 2001), this serves to shorten the optimal timber rotation and 
may decrease the value of forested land, making agriculture more attractive. In a model of 
optimal investment and resource use, Bohn and Deacon (2000) find that increased insecurity 
also results in lower overall forest stocks. 
The fourth type of model, land use cost-benefit analyses that compare the net present value of 
alternative land uses, has less clear implications. Mendelsohn’s (1994) seminal paper shows 
that tenure insecurity has an ambiguous impact on forest conversion to agriculture. Barbier 
and Burgess (2001) extend this model to show the potential rationality of “timber mining,” 
but tenure insecurity can ultimately promote or protect forests depending on parameter values. 
Angelsen (2007) uses a spatially explicit (von Thünen) model in which tenure insecurity is 
actually protective of forests. Amacher et al. (2009), which is the most complex but also most 
complete model, incorporates migration and illegal timber harvesting in the presence of tenure 
insecurity.  They derive some general lessons, but show that better approximations of reality 
result in complex outcomes with respect to tenure security.   
As a whole, the theoretical economic literature shows that the relationship between tenure 
insecurity and forests depends on local context. One contextual factor could be the way one 
frames the investment decision. If forest is assumed a productive investment in the model (i.e. 
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an industrial timber forest) then tenure insecurity promotes more deforestation (Bohn and 
Deacon 2000). Alternatively, if agriculture is modeled as a productive investment relative to 
(unproductive) forest, insecure tenure results in protection of forest (Angelsen 2007). An 
earlier review of economic tropical deforestation models by Kaimowitz and Angelsen (1998) 
concludes the most salient contextual factors that increase deforestation are increased 
agricultural and timber prices, decreased cost of labor, easy access to forest lands and 
opportunities for long-distance trade. They similarly conclude that the impact of tenure 
insecurity depends on local conditions.  
Even when we identify contextual conditions where the theoretical impact of tenure security 
is clear, it may be difficult to derive empirical lessons about particular forms of tenure or the 
mechanisms through which tenure insecurity works. Theoretical economic models deal with 
the form of tenure and tenure security in relatively crude ways. In most cases, models use a 
profit-maximizing framework and tenure security is a probability of expropriation of property. 
Profit-maximization implies no specific form of tenure, so these models provide no insight on 
how to compare, say, freehold, leasehold and customary tenure arrangements. No studies deal 
with the complex incentives that arise from different forms of tenure, much less the conflation 
of how the security of that form affects decisions (see Kaimowitz and Angelsen 1998:68).  
Nevertheless, the general lesson from this literature is that tenure security matters, but 
whether its effect is positive or negative on forests is dependent upon the context of the model 
and other model parameters. Further, tenure and tenure security are dealt with in ways that are 
too stylized to provide much guidance on what particular forms of tenure might work best on 
the ground. Therefore, we turn to the empirical literature to look for evidence of a relationship 
among different forms of tenure, tenure security and forest outcomes.  
4 Empirical Literature on Land Tenure and Forests 
4.1 Cases 
We selected studies that analyze land use change over time and discuss property rights or land 
tenure, targeting publications that use primary or secondary remote sensing data to measure 
forest cover change over time. For each study we use a standardized questionnaire to code all 
cases including questions regarding the effect of several key variables on deforestation such 
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as: owner type, the form of tenure, tenure security (assurance), governance, collective action 
and other proximate causes (infrastructure, agriculture, demographics, technology, etc.). 
Studies were disaggregated into the number of geographic sites analyzed and then into the 
forms of tenure present at each site. Our fundamental unit of analysis is then a particular form 
of tenure at a specific site, which we call a “case.”  
For a detailed description of the methods, see the Methods Appendix. But here we briefly 
explain the major steps for our review of the empirical literature. We first record the form of 
tenure for each case. The review of studies results in the following basic categories: 
unmanaged public land (frontier or open access), public land managed by a government 
agency (parks or reserves), communal, private and customary/traditional land. Where 
governments explicitly restricted the conversion of forests to other land uses and restrictions, 
we categorized these as managed public land. Where such restrictions were absent, but land 
still fell into the general public realm, we categorized these as unmanaged public land. 
Second, we use the context of the discussion or authors’ explicit recognition of the tenure 
security for that particular site. Finally, we record whether the forest outcome for this case is 
positive or negative relative to other cases in the study. Therefore, “slowed deforestation” is a 
positive outcome relative to “accelerated deforestation” on a different tenure form, although 
forest is lost in both cases. “Forest lost,” however, is a negative outcome relative to another 
form of tenure where we see “forest maintained.” Although such measure of tenure security 
and forest outcomes are sometimes subject to interpretation, this allows for meaningful 
comparison of various studies. 
We initially identified over 100 peer-reviewed publications as candidates, from which we 
drew 39 publications that ultimately fit within our selection criteria. Within these, we identify 
83 sites where forest cover was analyzed. Some sites contain multiple forms of tenure, 
resulting in 131 cases of tenure conditions tied to a specific site.  Although we aimed to have 
a geographically balanced sample, the majority of our cases come from Latin America, Africa 
and South Asia (Figure 2). We first review the association between the form of tenure and 
forest outcomes, and then investigate the interaction of tenure security and forest outcomes. 
We conclude our results with a regression model that takes into account these factors 
simultaneously. 
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Figure 2  Frequency of cases by region 
 
 
4.2 Form of Tenure  
We group the tenure form into four categories: public, private, protected and 
communal/customary land. The literature often conflates communal and customary forms of 
tenure, so we are restricted to categorizing both into a “communal” category.  
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Figure 3  Forest outcomes and type of tenure  
 
* the p value for a two-sided binomial probability test that 
the outcome is random (that is, that the proportion = 0.50) 
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Figure 3  Forest outcomes and type of tenure  
). Positive outcomes (64 cases) refer to slowed deforestation rates, maintained forest cover or 
regenerated forest cover. Negative outcomes (67 cases) generally include increased 
deforestation rates or loss of forest.  
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Figure 3  Forest outcomes and type of tenure  
 also shows that, in general, we find no clear evidence to suggest one specific tenure type is 
optimal for protecting forests. Negative outcomes pervade all tenure types. However, we do 
see that public frontier land is associated with more negative forest outcomes and that 
protected land seems to also have slightly more positive outcomes than negative ones.  
 
Figure 4  Regional forest outcomes by tenure 
a. Africa b. Central America c. South America 
   
 
 
Regionally, we see patterns emerge for some tenure forms in the three most heavily 
researched regions (we exclude South Asia due to almost exclusive analysis of communal 
land in publications from that region). Though we cannot make strong conclusions due to our 
limited sample size within regions, communal tenure seems to perform somewhat poorly in 
Africa (Figure 4a), somewhat well in Central America (Figure 4b) and has more mixed effects 
in South America (Figure 4c). Overall, private land also leads to mixed outcomes, but seems 
to perform worse in Central America. Protected areas, uniformly, have slightly more positive 
than negative results within each region, but the opposite is true for public frontier land. The 
negative result for public land reflects cases of illegally occupied land at the forest-farm 
interface and encroachment into the frontier, the majority of which occur in studies from the 
Amazon. These results give us some reason to question our first null hypothesis, that the form 
of tenure has no relationship with forest outcomes, especially when we look at public and 
protected land.  
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4.3 Tenure security 
Tenure security, alone, does not guarantee the preservation of forest cover. Figure 5 shows 
that even with secure tenure2, negative cases are common, but positive outcomes occur 
significantly more often than negative ones. Similarly, when tenure is insecure, a negative 
forest outcome is significantly more likely than a positive one. Tenure security seems to help 
keep forests in tact, but we find no discernable results by region with respect to tenure 
security.  
 
Figure 5  Forest outcomes with and without secure tenure 
a. Secure tenure b. Insecure tenure 
         
* The p value for a two-sided binomial probability test that the outcome is random (the 
proportion = 0.50). 
 
Figure 6 generally shows that not only are positive and negative outcomes possible over all 
tenure types, so are secure and insecure tenure conditions. Notably public and protected areas 
seem particularly prone to insecure conditions3 and, for communal land, insecurity seems 
most closely associated with negative outcomes.  
Using a probit regression model, Regarding the second null hypothesis, we see empirical 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis that tenure security is not important. Although greater 
implied tenure security seems to improve the probability of positive forest outcomes, tenure 
security by no means prevents changes in forest cover, as can be seen in Figure 5. Payments 
                                                
2 Of our cases 42 out of 95 had (implied) tenure security. 
3 This is possibly due to publication bias. Protected areas receive more attention when they are insecure, and public frontier areas 
have received attention for encroachment into the forest-farm interface via illegal occupation, which is a condition of 
insecurity. 
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or policies must take into account conditions that determine the value of alternative land uses 
relative to forest for local landholders.  
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Table 1 presents the marginal effects for multiple factors that influence positive (1) or 
negative (0) forest outcome, including a binary measure of tenure security (1=present, 
0=absent) and dummy variables for the form of tenure. The first model (I) controls for tenure 
security and form, model (II) includes regional controls and model (III) adds interaction terms 
shown important in the descriptive results above. These models perform relatively well, 
correctly predicting 71-73% of the observations. The results are qualitatively consistent with 
equivalent linear probability (ordinary least-squares) and logit models (the sign, significance 
and relative magnitudes are all similar). 
 
Figure 6  Form and tenure security 
 
 
Irrespective of controls for the form of tenure and other regional effects, tenure security has a 
consistent positive effect on forest outcomes. On average our results imply that having secure 
tenure improves the probability of a positive forest outcome by about 40%.  
Encouragingly, forests that are protected (parks and forest reserves) are about 40-50% more 
likely to be associated with positive forest outcomes relative to private land rights. After 
controlling for other factors, the effects of public and private land are not statistically 
different. The same is true for communal land until we specifically account for communal 
land in Africa. After including this interaction term (model III) the coefficient on communal 
land increases in magnitude and significance. This also statistically confirms the association 
between negative forest outcomes on communal land in Africa, noticeable in Figure 4a, which 
decreases the probability of a positive outcome by 50% in our sample. Other regional dummy 
variables show little influence on our forest outcome measure relative to the reference group 
of sites in Africa.  
0	   10	   20	   30	   40	  
public	  
protected	  
private	  
communal	  
pos	  +	  secure	   pos	  +	  insecure	  
neg	  +	  secure	   neg	  +	  insecure	  
 23 
With regard to our first null hypothesis that the form of tenure does not matter, these results 
imply a mixed message. When controlling for other factors, namely tenure security, the effect 
of protected areas have a consistently positive impact on forest outcomes over the other forms 
of tenure.4 However, the outcomes from private and public land are statistically 
indistinguishable. Most simply, this makes sense because the “protected” class is the only 
form of land tenure that dictates a particular land cover, that is, that the land remains forested. 
All other forms of tenure give use rights and decision making to the landholder(s), who(m) 
may or may not find it beneficial to keep a particular piece of land in forest.  
Regarding the second null hypothesis, we see empirical evidence to reject the null hypothesis 
that tenure security is not important. Although greater implied tenure security seems to 
improve the probability of positive forest outcomes, tenure security by no means prevents 
changes in forest cover, as can be seen in Figure 5. Payments or policies must take into 
account conditions that determine the value of alternative land uses relative to forest for local 
landholders.  
 
  
                                                
4 The constant, whose marginal effects are not calculated, represents the reference group of private property (I) or private 
property in Africa (II, III). In models I and II, the constant was negative and borderline significant (p ≅ 0.09 in both cases). In 
model III, the sign was negative but not significant (p ≅ 0.22). 
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Table 1  Marginal effects for the predictors of the probability of observing negative (0) 
or positive (1) forest outcomes 
 
I II III 
Tenure security 0.41 (0.09)***  0.42 (0.09)***  0.39 (0.10)*** 
Communal 0.12 (0.13)  0.11 (0.15)  0.26 (0.15)* 
Protected 0.38 (0.18)**  0.41 (0.18)**  0.47 (0.16)*** 
Public 0.15 (0.17)  0.17 (0.17)  0.29 (0.18) 
Private (reference) 
     
 
  Central America 
   
0.04 (0.08)  -0.13 (0.15) 
South America 
   
0.02 (0.10)  -0.03 (0.18) 
East Asia 
   
-0.08 (0.08)  -0.23 (0.16) 
South Asia 
   
0.06 (0.09)  -0.08 (0.20) 
Southeast Asia 
   
0.38 (0.18)**  0.21 (0.18) 
South Pacific 
   
-0.09 (0.13)  -0.22 (0.14) 
Africa (reference) 
        Communal*Africa 
      
-0.52 (0.26)** 
Public*S America 
      
-0.30 (0.25) 
Duration of analysis (yrs)  0.00 (0.00) 
n 129   129   119  
log psuedolikelihood -77.0   -75.4   -63.3  
pseudo-R2 0.14   0.16   0.23  
% correctly 
predicted  71%   71%   73%  
Coefficients reported represent the marginal effect of a discrete change in a variable from 0 to 1. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by publication. 
* p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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5 Broad Lessons from the Land Tenure Literature 
5.1 The form of tenure does not imply security  
The results of our analysis show that all forms of land tenure are susceptible to tenure 
insecurity. However, often land tenure security is mistakenly linked with particular forms of 
land tenure. Perhaps born out of concepts embodied in The Tragedy of the Commons (Hardin 
1968), open access resource models (e.g. Gordon 1954) and early assumptions that titling land 
would solve deforestation problems (van den Brink et al. 2006), property rights over natural 
resources are often naïvely viewed along a spectrum of “strength” from unstable open access 
systems to strong private ownership. Common property resource systems are seen as middle 
ground (Cheung 1970, Dasgupta and Heal 1979). Private property rights are conceptualized as 
the most secure, where owners are able to maximize profits and harvest sustainably. In areas 
with no formal property rights, so the story goes, resources are overharvested and profits 
dwindle because tenure is insecure. This view promotes the idea that individual forms of land 
tenure are more secure, while tenure granted to larger groups are assumed inherently weak. 
The empirical cases reviewed here show that these assumptions are incorrect. 
Decades of common property research shows that informal social controls and local collective 
action can mitigate the “tragedy” resulting from competition over common-pool resources 
(Agrawal Arun 2001, Bromley DW 1992, Ostrom 1990), and even systems that have no 
operating rules over resource use can perform quite close to private systems depending on 
local context. It is a fallacy to categorically ascribe security to any particular form of land 
tenure. 
In our view, it is an oversimplification to empirically equate land tenure security with private 
property rights or the possession of land title. Many forms of tenure are legitimate when 
properly recognized by national and/or local legal systems (Bruce et al. 2010). Yet scholars 
constrained by data collection limitations and time may assume private rights are the most 
secure (e.g. Pichón 1997), and use title as a basis to infer the effect of tenure security. But 
legitimate communal land, public property and leased property can also be secure and, in 
some cases, private holdings may be suboptimal for other reasons. For instance, Wainwright 
(2009) describes a process of privatizing communal land that instigated land speculation and 
 26 
clashed with local cultural and spiritual beliefs. Others have argued that tenure security can, at 
times, have negative consequences for environmental public goods (Garnett et al. 2007). 
5.2 Communal land 
More than one billion people depend on forests for their livelihoods (FAO 2008), and large 
fraction live in communities with communal or customary rights to forest (Agrawal A 2007). 
Thus communal land is a special category of interest. Further, agencies are exploring initially 
targeting communal land for REDD+ programs to avoid high transaction costs associated with 
identifying, contracting with and monitoring individual landowners.  
Looking at the body of studies reviewed, communal and customary land tenure have mixed 
effects on forest outcomes (  
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Figure 3  Forest outcomes and type of tenure  
), but some patterns begin to emerge at the regional level (Figure 4). In African communities, 
communal and customary land tenure systems seem to have a negative association with forest 
outcomes. In part, this could be due to our inability to distinguish between communal systems 
and customary ownership. In many African cases, customary rights are more common and 
had much historical significance but, recently, enforcement of traditional rules has been 
difficult due to population growth, poverty and emerging market and political forces (e.g. 
Kakembo 2001, Mwavu and Witkowski 2008). Further, Africa has been especially wrought 
with civil conflict and related changes in governance structures. These have likely had an 
impact on natural resource use. 
An emerging body of “large-N” research is documenting how communities can engage in 
collective action to prevent degradation of common pool resources, particularly when a 
community has recognized property rights. Van Laerhoven (2010) finds community 
monitoring and maintenance among the most important predictors of forest stability, and 
Gibson et al (2005) argues that rule enforcement is important for positive community forest 
outcomes. Hayes (2006) highlights the importance of communal rules, and forest governance 
is linked with positive forest outcomes in Persha et al’s (2011) study of Asian and African 
communal forests and Hyde et al’s (2003) study of forests in China. Similarly, Pagdee (2006) 
finds a positive correlation between tenure security and positive forest outcomes in a meta 
analysis of common property studies.  
Our review shows a mix of outcomes for forests held in common, highlighting the fact that 
communal settings face land use pressures just like any other form of land tenure. Other work 
shows that degradation of the commons can rightfully be attributed to conditions from outside 
a user group as well, acknowledging the need to address larger institutional incoherence 
(Bromley DW 2008). Therefore even when rights to common lands are secure, collective 
decision-making may find it desirable to convert forest to some other land use. 
5.3 Tenure data and measurement  
In reviewing the empirical literature, it is apparent that over the past twenty years data on 
forest cover and forest conditions is increasing in both quantity and quality, but the same is 
not true of land tenure data, which require physical delineation and demarcation of social 
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relations, which are sometimes contested. The quality of remotely sensed data increases with 
technology, but measuring tenure often involves knowledge of intangible relationships or 
agreements between communities. Analysis of forest cover change is evolving to explore 
temporal dynamics and spatial patterns, yet investigation of the drivers of forest cover change 
is lagging, often due to insufficient data on spatially explicit land tenure at various points in 
time. 
Spatial land tenure datasets are rarely available, requiring researchers to create maps from 
proxies. At the regional or national scale, often the best source for tenure data is an 
agricultural census, which focuses only on certain types of landholdings (mainly lands 
managed for cultivation or livestock, with limited forested areas), and neglects local nuance in 
communal and customary rules and norms. At a more local scale, household surveys and 
participatory mapping are key method for deriving spatial definitions of land tenure. This 
translates into datasets that may be consistent with community perceptions but may not, in 
fact, be recognized by the state or surrounding communities. Therefore, external validity can 
be an issue. For these reasons, it can be difficult to find agreement with locally-derived tenure 
data and regional or nationally-defined land tenure systems. 
As a specific example we note our difficulties parsing communal and customary land tenure 
for this review (noted above, communal and customary forms of tenure were often conflated, 
restricting us to categorize both in a “communal” category). Communal land is the label often 
used to categorize a range of tenure forms related to customary and common property rights 
that do not fit neatly into other categories (Ankersen and Barnes 2004). Communities with 
customary land rights may have complex rules and overlapping forms of tenure that apply to 
different land based resources (e.g., Long and Zhou 2001) and are a complex of open and 
communal regimes. How are researchers to categorize such systems for comparability with 
other areas? Without a good way to deal with these issues, studies tend to use “common 
property” as a catch-all term for what can be a set of wildly diverse governance systems.  
Key challenges remain in conceptually linking and spatially modeling human dimensions that 
influence or drive tropical deforestation. “Tenure” is sometimes simply noted as a 
deforestation risk factor or driver, but without a causal explanation (Rudel et al. 2005). 
“People and pixels” issues are of particular concern for studies attempting to match forest 
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cover change results based on remotely-sensed imagery with locally-derived forest tenure and 
governance variables (Liverman and Cuesta 2008, Ostrom and Nagendra 2006).   
Correctly documenting the form of tenure is challenging, but measuring tenure security is 
even more difficult since security can be legitimate or perceived and security is largely 
determined by intangible characteristics that influence decision-making. For these reasons, 
few empirical articles explicitly aim to measure tenure security (Arnot et al. 2011). Further, 
the form of land tenure is fundamentally a static concept while land tenure security is 
inherently forward-looking, expressing the expectation that the benefits and duties provided 
by the rules and norms that make up land tenure will be upheld in the future (Sjaastad and 
Bromley 2000). Tenure security reflects a perception of risk.   
6 Conclusion 
6.1 How does tenure matter? 
The main goal of this article is to better understand when tenure and tenure security are likely 
to be important factors in the conversion of forest to farmland. First, we emphasize that land 
tenure is inextricably linked to many socioeconomic and governance factors, thus it is 
difficult to disentangle tenure from other direct and indirect causes of deforestation. Most 
fundamentally, the form of land tenure can be composed of many different property right 
bundles, and specific bundles affect forest outcomes in different ways. Further, the review of 
empirical studies reveals that no form is immune from deforestation pressure. 
At an aggregate level, the form of land tenure seems to matter in different ways in different 
regions of the world. We cannot rule out selection bias given our relatively small sample of 
case studies in each region, but these outcomes seem to emphasize the importance of local 
factors. Overall, protected land is associated with the positive outcomes in all regions, but 
public land seems to be taken advantage of particularly in South America. Communal land 
seems to perform well in Central America but worse in Africa, possibly due to the effects of 
regional conflict. However, in particularly poor areas, common property can be advantageous 
in other ways: community members can access common land for farming when external 
shocks would otherwise induce crises (van den Brink et al. 2006).  
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Table 2  Does Tenure Security Slow Deforestation? Sample Explanations from the 
Literature 
Yes (clearly important) Helps, but inadequate Insignificant 
“The main outcome of this 
paper is that insecure 
property rights in land 
drive deforestation in the 
Brazilian Amazon.” 
- (Araujo et al. 2009) 
“Defined land tenure is not 
enough to guarantee a successful 
settlement that combines 
intensive forms of agriculture and 
conservation of forest.” 
- (Futemma and Brondizio 2003) 
Threats from outsiders – colonists, 
Shining Path guerrillas, road crews 
– continued to plague the Yanesha, 
even after they had official title to 
their land.  
- (Morrow 1996) 
As the above findings 
show, all things being 
equal, titled farmers 
deforest less than those 
without title. …thus [no 
title] causes negative 
environmental effects 
whenever it leads farmers 
to forgo investment in the 
agricultural resource base 
they would otherwise have 
undertaken.”  
- (Pichón 1997) 
It is unclear whether, alone, the 
common property institutions of 
Tziscao would be sufficient to 
prevent overuse of the common 
pool forest resource; the needs of 
the growing population of Tziscao 
may perhaps exceed their 
managerial scope. At present, 
joint regulations [communal and 
national park] are robust enough 
to respond to the needs of current 
residents of the community.”  
- (Johnson and Nelson 2004) 
“The results of this study suggest 
that interactions between land use 
factors may be more important in 
determining miombo woodland 
regeneration and re-growth 
structure than land tenure type. 
Accordingly, it is recommended 
that future management of 
miombo woodland should 
emphasize more the regulation of 
land use activities than the 
changing of land tenure systems.”  
- (Chidumayo 2002) 
 
Further, while we have argued that the form of tenure can take many shapes, ensuring that 
tenure is secure is perhaps more important for designing policies to influence forest outcomes. 
Theoretical economic models demonstrate that decreases in tenure security decrease the net 
present value of all land uses, but can impact forested land uses more than agriculture. This is 
not always the case, as land use decisions are fundamentally determined by the evaluating the 
value of land use options, so surely we would never expect safeguarding tenure security alone 
to stop deforestation. However, security does seem to increase the empirical probably of 
positive forest outcomes, even after controlling for regional factors and the form of tenure. 
Table 2 gives sample explanations for the connection between tenure (security) and 
deforestation from some of the empirical literature we review above. Some studies claim 
tenure is of the utmost importance, while others find it marginal or insignificant. 
In sum, land tenure and tenure security are not, in and of themselves, perfect safeguards for 
forests. Tenure and tenure security enable landholders, whether individuals, household or 
communities, to take into account future values into current decision-making. This matters not 
just for forests, but for any benefit accruing from the land over time. However, in light of PES 
programs and REDD+, where future incentives are tied to particular land use-based duties 
(e.g. maintain forestland), the security of tenure is crucial to influence landholders’ decision-
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making. Therefore, tenure security is necessary to prevent deforestation through market-based 
mechanisms, but alone does not necessarily protect forests. A quote by Garnett et al (2007) 
captures this nicely:  
… tenure is not always an effective means of protecting natural capital. When equitable 
tenure is established, it can provide incentives to invest in built capital rather than 
conserve natural capital. Although sustainable management of natural resources is seen 
as one of the benefits of land reform, the capacity to invest in agricultural 
intensification is an even more desirable consequence…  Nor does secure communal 
tenure necessarily protect natural values… Thus, secure tenure and land title may not 
be a universal panacea for poor management of the commons. 
6.2 Future research 
Future empirical studies should be clear in describing how they conceptualize issues around 
tenure form and security. What forms of tenure exist in the study area? What is the respective 
security of each land tenure form as perceived by landholders? To simply use land title as a 
metric for tenure security should be avoided, at least without proper justification relative to 
other factors that might affect tenure security in the study area.  
As better data become available, we see a need for more studies that analyze site-specific land 
use change over time or account for covarying land qualities across tenure types. Joppa and 
Pfaff (2010) describe the advantages of statistical “matching” techniques for land cover 
datasets that addresses the latter concern. Most studies reviewed compared forest cover trends 
for different areas that have different tenure regimes, but this ignores the potential 
endogeneity of tenure choice that may be based, at least in part, on existing forest 
characteristics. For example, productive forests near urban centers might be under private 
management to protect that productivity. Communal holdings may be in rural areas simply 
because competition is weaker and enforcement of borders is not as costly. Additionally, with 
time series data studies should increasingly be able to use techniques to control for time-
varying factors through difference-in-difference methods or a combination of difference-in-
difference and matching.  Looking at changes in deforestation trends on the same piece of 
land with a change in tenure, while controlling for other time-varying factors and 
endogeneity, better captures tenure’s ceretis paribus effect. 
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A better understanding of how the larger suite of economic and social pressures impact forest 
users is needed. These macro conditions often create incentives that induce encroachment into 
forests, but are not often given credit for “explaining” deforestation activity. Documenting 
and understanding such linkages is largely missing, and addressing the larger institutional 
factors underlying these problems is a much more challenging issue (Bromley DW 2008). 
Most important, research is needed to better understand how to strengthen tenure security. In 
many areas, communities have legal land rights, but do not feel secure that other policy 
changes or political maneuvers will compromise those rights. Land tenure insecurity is likely 
a symptom of more broad political and economic systemic incoherence that individuals face. 
We must often look beyond forests themselves to find the final causes of deforestation in a 
region (Bromley Daniel W. 1999). With regard to the implementation of REDD+, 
communities need assurance that current land use decisions will result in future benefits. 
What are options to promote landholders’ security in current tenure arrangements, and which 
are most likely to be effective in what situations? In general, likely the most important is the 
hard work of strengthening legal and social institutions. Some interim steps may include 
promotional campaigns, prosecuting more cases against land claims and dialogue among 
communities and agents of the state to ensure claims will be upheld. 
6.3 Addressing tenure issues at the forest-farm interface 
To reduce emissions is to halt expansion of the frontier. Policies that aim to limit further 
conversion of forest to agriculture must first understand the incentives for conversion. Are 
there policies favoring agricultural conversion? Are there recent changes in relative 
agricultural or forest-product prices, access to markets or the arrival of new technologies that 
might be shaping incentives for greater conversion? If so, these factors may have just as 
much, if not more, short-term impact on emissions at the forest-farm interface as securing 
tenure. Moreover, policies that aim to change land use decisions must provide enough 
incentive to reverse any landholder’s incentive to engage in agriculture. But to understand 
what quantity of compensation is “enough,” we must understand the context in which land 
use decisions are made. Additionally, security in such payments is needed. For policies to 
have any lasting effect, clarifying tenure and developing a supporting institutional 
environment to back tenure claims is crucial. 
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That said, where tenure security is currently lacking, transitions can be difficult (Ho and 
Spoor 2006). In some cases, the process of clarifying tenure can hastened deforestation. 
Securing tenure may result in increased access to credit, which can positively or negatively 
impact forests. In another example, Deacon and Mueller (2006) argue that strengthening 
property rights can encourage competition for land acquisition, resulting in rent-seeking 
behavior with the potential for violent conflict. Deforestation can also accelerate when 
securing tenure is tied to “beneficial use” of land (i.e., deforestation), as we see in many of the 
studies of the Amazonian region (e.g. Mena et al. 2006, Rudel 1995, van Gils and Ugon 
2006). In Côte d'Ivoire a process aimed to fully capture the rights tied to communal access to 
resources, but this proved to be complex and ended in a simplification of rights that 
strengthened individual rights over common ones (van den Brink et al. 2006).  
These anecdotes caution us that efforts to clarify tenure can be risky for people and for 
forests. Tenure interventions likely improve livelihoods for some but may worsen it for 
others. Clarifying and strengthening tenure are costly and slow, but investment is needed for 
both social equity and environmental sustainability. Resolving tenure issues is not just about 
clearly demarcating boundaries, but can sometimes resemble a conflict resolution process. 
Working both at local- and policy-levels is vital to ensure smooth social and statutory 
transitions (Garnett et al. 2007). 
Our review of studies highlights the complexity of on-the-ground tenure situations. Land 
tenure and the related issue of “whom to pay” has been widely recognized in the context of 
REDD+ (Cotula and Mayers 2009, Sandbrook et al. 2010, Sunderlin et al. 2009, Wendland 
2008), and the empirical literature shows that complex tenure arrangements should be 
considered the rule and not the exception (Unruh 2008).   
We need a frame of reference for tenure security in any given situation in order to understand 
its effect on forests. Tenure insecurity is often cited as a cause for resource degradation. But 
inferring a causal relationship between tenure security, singularly, and deforestation is to 
ignore the larger context in which tenure is embedded and defines the impact of such an 
institution. This is certainly one reason for tenure’s varied outcomes regarding forest cover 
seen in the literature reviewed above. Secure tenure helps prevent deforestation in some areas, 
but does not change landholders’ underlying right to make land use decisions as they see fit. 
Indeed, when there are strong benefits to clearing forest, a landholder with secure rights will 
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need very strong external incentives to keep her forest ecosystems intact. Tenure and tenure 
security matter, but they matter only in the context of other policy, economic and 
infrastructural changes. We stress the need for secure and clear land rights, but policy makers 
and policy promoters must be mindful of the larger context within which communities are 
embedded. 
7 Methods Appendix 
7.1 Framework for assessing empirical studies 
Our conceptual framework aims to measure whether there is a relationship between tenure or 
tenure security and forest outcomes using prior published empirical studies. We first record 
the form of tenure being discussed. Second, we use the context of the discussion or author’s 
explicit recognition of the tenure security of that particular land area or parcel. Finally, we 
record whether the incentives for forest conservation are higher or lower, relative to forest 
held in other types of tenure in the study. At each of these three levels, we choose decision 
rules about how to develop categories. We describe these decision rules in detail below, and 
then give an example from one of the case studies included in the review. 
We first record the form of tenure as described by paper authors. From paper descriptions, it 
is not always possible to discern de jure from de facto tenure. When these concepts are both 
clearly discussed within a study, we opt to use the de facto arrangement for analysis, since de 
facto arrangements drive landholders’ decisions. The review of studies results in the 
following categories: unmanaged public land (frontier or open access), public land managed 
by a government agency (parks or reserves), communal, private, usufruct rights, 
leasehold/rent, customary/traditional, and concession land. To facilitate comparisons, we re-
categorize usufruct rights, leasehold and concession into either private, communal/customary, 
protected or frontier land, using the context of the paper to determine the best fit. We also 
collapse communal tenure and customary/traditional tenure into one category. In some cases, 
we think it is likely that land labeled “communal” would be better described as customary. In 
our view, the lesser bias is to use one communal category to summarize our findings.  
Many empirical studies mention the importance of tenure security, but few explicitly make a 
claim as to the particular security or insecurity of land parcels. In cases where tenure security 
 35 
was not explicitly addressed we turn to the context of the study to infer the implied tenure 
security for that form of tenure. Situations we label “insecure” are where, for example, de jure 
and de facto tenure are not the same, communities are adjusting to new tenure arrangements 
or enforcement and monitoring of tenure arrangements are stated as particularly weak.  
At the third level, forest outcomes are reported in various ways. Some studies report relative 
measures for forest outcomes, e.g. comparing forest conditions under one form of tenure to 
forest conditions in a different form. Others report absolute changes in forest cover over time. 
Those that look at relative measures tend to celebrate not only forest regeneration, but also 
slowed deforestation. Others report any absolute forest loss negatively. Relatively few studies 
analyze how forest outcomes change with a change in tenure on the same piece of land, but 
simply report forest outcomes associated with different tenure. Regardless, we treat these 
equally in our review, which simply discerns the forest outcome associated with a particular 
tenure type. 
For forest cover, we first categorize outcomes as reported by the studies. For relative studies 
we record whether deforestation accelerated, slowed or if forest regeneration accelerated 
relative to comparative areas in the study. When only the magnitude of forest stock was 
reported, we recorded whether forests were maintained, lost or regenerated5. We then 
simplify these categories into a binary positive and negative forest outcome. Relative 
measures imply a clear normative relationship: accelerated deforestation is negative while 
slowed deforestation or forest regeneration is positive. However, when studies only report 
absolute measures, we generally classified forest loss as negative and forest maintained or 
regenerated as positive, but look to the study for contextual interpretation.  
As an example of study coding, Futemma (2003) describes a case in which land users have 
had de facto rights to the land for centuries, but recently the forest was delineated and usufruct 
rights were granted to households while private titling was in process. We categorize this 
tenure form as private since the land has been delineated and landholders know title is 
coming, but we label its tenure as insecure since title has yet to come and the system is in 
                                                
5 We try to focus on relative measures since our focus here is on the relative performance of secure tenure and the relative 
measures contain the absolute information (i.e., if deforestation is slowed or accelerated, we know there was forest lost in 
either case). 
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flux. In this study, Futemma shows that usufruct rights resulted in forest loss, which we 
categorize as negative. 
7.2 Methods 
7.2.1 Case selection 
We select cases that analyze land use change over time and discuss property rights or land 
tenure. We target studies that use primary or secondary remote sensing data to measure forest 
cover change over time, but include cases where change in forest outcomes is measured using 
in-field inventories or discussed in careful detail.  
To find publications, we searched academic databases with combinations of terms related to 
forests, land tenure, property rights, land use and remote measurement. Publications selected 
for analysis are also reviewed for reference to relevant studies. Finally, we asked several key 
informant academics to review our list of publications and offer suggestions for other studies. 
We narrow our selection to 39 publications and drop studies that do not meet our criteria. 
7.2.2 Coding of cases 
We use a standardized questionnaire to code all cases. The questionnaire includes questions 
about the effect of several key variables on deforestation such as: owner type, the form of 
tenure, tenure security (assurance), governance, collective action and other proximate causes 
(infrastructure, agriculture, demographics, technology, etc.). The survey contains mostly 
structured questions but includes open ended responses to capture nuance in findings. 
Questionnaires were each completed by the co-authors or coders (graduate students) who are 
trained in the relevant issues and broadly familiar with the literature. After coding cases 
began, regular meetings were held with all coders to ensure consistency in interpretation, 
reporting and to address other conceptual issues as a team. Before compilation of findings, the 
lead author additionally reviewed all articles and responses for consistency. 
7.2.3 Analysis methods and assumptions 
All studies were input into a database by the number of sites analyzed within a study. Sites are 
further disaggregated into the forms of tenure present at each site, which were each labeled as 
a separate case. Cases are our fundamental units of analysis, each carrying equal weight. We 
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compile descriptive statistics by case and, when appropriate, we use statistical tests to infer 
confidence in observed differences. 
7.2.4 Limitations  
As with any review of literature, our inferences are inherently biased since the studies we 
review take place in settings where forests and tenure issues are particularly salient. Thus, 
there is inherent bias in our sample selection. 
In some geographic areas, we found a limited amount of published literature. For example, we 
encountered relatively few studies in Asia and the south Pacific (Figure 2), where remote 
sensing analyses have been less frequent and tenure studies often focuses on communal or 
customary land managed by minority groups (e.g., see Pagdee et al. 2006), but forest cover 
change is less quantitative. Similarly, forest cover change in West Africa seems to have 
received limited attention (although Africa as a continent is well represented). There, studies 
are dominated with other explanatory factors such as migration, climate change and colonial 
inheritance (Ouedraogo et al. 2009, Ouedraogo et al. 2010, Paré et al. 2010, Wardell et al. 
2003). Where land tenure is explicitly discussed it often comes in the context of complex 
community relations and resource-allocation norms but is not connected to forests (Reenberg 
2001).  
7.2.5 Case descriptions 
The majority of our 43 sites are in tropical forest and the dominant land use activities are 
subsistence agriculture, livestock production, subsistence forest use and commercial 
agriculture ( 
Table 3). Twenty-nine of the sites are located in protected areas and 16 were on indigenous 
groups’ land. 
 
Table 3  Dominant vegetation and land uses at 43 sites 
Dominant vegetation types  Dominant economic land use activity 
tropical forest 92   subsistence agriculture 122  
wetlands 14   subsistence forest use 82  
montane forest 27   commercial agriculture 63  
grassland 7   livestock production/ranching 61  
tropical dry forest 9   commercial NTFP collection 41  
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mangroves 3   commercial logging 24  
    hunting 13  
    tourism 7  
 
While remote sensing data was used 28 sites, the remaining cases utilized previous remote 
sensing studies, plot-level analysis, or household and community surveys to examine land use 
change. Remote sensing utilized mostly Landsat imagery (24 of the 28 sites) and focused on 
change over time from forest to non-forest or the conversion of forest to agriculture. Many of 
these studies used hybrid approaches to match remote sensing analysis with household or 
community-based surveys (22 sites). The duration of analysis ranges from one to fifty years 
(Table 4), with an average of 14 years. The study area for each site varies considerably, from 
less than one square kilometer to approximately 5 million km² (the area of the nine Brazilian 
Amazonian states). Excluding the high outlier, the average size of area studied is 4,856 km².      
Table 4  Case areas and duration of analysis 
 Minimum Mean Median Maximum N (# reporting) 
Study area (km2) 0.06 4,856* 241 64,000* 99 
Duration analyzed (# yrs) 1 14.2 12 50 121 
*After excluding the high-end outlier (5million km² (Araujo et al.)). 
 
We also gathered information on how forest outcomes were associated with other measures, 
such as the length of time over which forest cover change was analyzed, presence of violent 
conflict, infrastructure characteristics and other demographic factors. However, none of these 
factors showed a significant relationship with forest cover or their presence in our study set 
was limited. Since our focus is on tenure measures, we report these in the main text.  
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